The Demand for Current Public Expenditure in Fiji: Theory and Empirical Results by Doessel, Darrel & Valadkhani, Abbas
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The Demand for Current Public
Expenditure in Fiji: Theory and
Empirical Results
Darrel Doessel and Abbas Valadkhani
Department of Economics, University of Queensland, UNE Business
School, University of New England
2003
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/50391/
MPRA Paper No. 50391, posted 6 October 2013 06:04 UTC
 0
 
 
 
THEORY AND ECONOMETRIC EVIDENCE EXPLAINING 
PUBLIC EXPENDITURE: THE CASE OF IRAN* 
 
 
 
By 
D.P. DOESSEL 
 Reader 
 School of Economics 
 The University of Queensland 
Qld 4072, Australia 
Tel: +61-7- 3365 6424 (W) and +61-7-3378 6853 (h) 
Fax: +61-7-3365 7299 
 
 
and  
 
 
ABBAS VALADKHANI 
Lecturer 
School of Economics and Finance 
Queensland University of Technology 
GPO Box 2434 
Brisbane, Qld 4001, Australia. 
Email: a.valadkhani@qut.edu.au 
Tel:  +61-7-3864 1233 
Fax:  +61-7-3864 1500 
 
 
 
* We wish to acknowledge the helpful comments of the two anonymous referees. The 
usual caveat applies. 
 1
  
Abstract  
 
The purpose of this paper is to analyse government expenditure in Iran using annual time 
series data for the period 1963-2000. Various theories of the size of government are 
reviewed and a distinction is made between economic/structural determinants and 
institutional determinants. Categorising the theories of government expenditure in this 
way suggests the application of non-nested tests as a mechanism whereby the relative 
importance of the two broad theoretical categories can be determined. The empirical 
results, indicating "double rejection", reveal that neither the economic/structural 
determinants nor the institutional determinants alone are sufficient to explain government 
expenditure in Iran. A comprehensive, incorporating explanatory variables from both 
models provides a robust explanation of the data. This paper presents the first empirical 
estimates of the own-price elasticity of the demand, and income elasticity of the demand, 
for current government expenditures in Iran. 
Keywords: Government expenditure, Non-nested tests, Iran, Economic determinants, 
Institutional determinants. 
 
1. Introduction 
Since the pioneering studies by Borcherding and Deacon (1972), Bergstrom and 
Goodman (1973) and Deacon (1978), the analysis of the growth of government 
expenditure has ceased to be characterised by the atheoretical or ad hoc analyses that 
were dominant until then. Essentially the modern analysis of the demand for goods and 
services provided by government involves an application of the median voter hypothesis, 
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associated with Downs (1957). This conception will be referred to below as “the 
economic/structural model” . 
 In essence the demand for public goods is conceived of as the outcome of the 
demand for public goods by the median voter, or as Borcherding (1985) puts it, by "the 
Fiscal Everyman". Put otherwise the demand for government expenditure is regarded as a 
function of the characteristics of the median voter. This conceptual framework leads to a 
relatively parsimonious specification of the explanatory variables in the demand equation. 
Those factors are as follows: prices, income and population, as well as some other 
relevant variables. For and exposition see, inter alia, Larkey, Stolp and Winer (1981), 
Mueller (1989) and Brown and Jackson (1986). 
 Other theories have been postulated: Wagner (1883) points to structural change 
and rising incomes; Peacock and Wiseman (1967) argue for “displacement associated 
with some crisis, such as war; and Nordhaus (1975) has argued a political business cycle.  
It is not our purpose here to enumerate these numerous theories and/or create a new 
classification scheme. See for example Lybeck (1988) for a 12-fold classification of such 
theories, Henrekson (1988) for a categorisation of demand and supply side determinants 
and Mueller (1989: 320-47) for a five-fold classification scheme. 
 The approach adopted in this paper is to categorise explanatory variables of 
government expenditure as being of an economic/structural kind and of an institutional 
nature. This dual scheme has been employed by, inter alia, Borcherding (1985). Such a 
formulation suggests a means by which an indication of the relative importance of these 
two models can be established. Viewing explanatory variables in this way invites the 
application of non-nested tests (Pesaran and Deaton, 1978) 
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 A second important approach to explain government expenditure is what is 
referred to below as “the institutional model”. This approach covers a wide range of 
issues such as the political business cycle (Rogoff, 1990), political revolution (such as the 
overthrown of the House of Pahlavi in 1979 and the establishment of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran), macroeconomic variables such as unemployment and inflation, the 
power of pressure groups (Tullock, 1959, Stigler, 1970, Olson, 1982, Mueller and 
Murrell, 1986, and Marlow and Orzechowski, 1996), fiscal illusion (Buchanan, 1967, and 
incrementalism (Wildavsky, 1964). Also, it should be recognised exogenous shocks, such 
as Iraqi war can have important repercussions on government expenditure.    
 The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 briefly presents a theoretical 
framework for our analysis. Section 3 presents a short account of the structure of the 
government sector in Iran and some relevant time series data on the phenomena to be 
explained. Section 4 provides the econometric results of a comprehensive multiple 
regression equation. Section 5 presents a summary of the analysis. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework and Estimation Procedure 
It is not our purpose here to provide a comprehensive review and evaluation of the 
theoretical and empirical literature on the demand for public goods: such a review is 
provided recently in Doessel and Valadkhani (2002). We provide here only a brief outline 
of the estimating procedure we have adopted.  
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2.1. The economic/structural model 
Following Gemmell (1990), the demand for real government expenditure can be stated as 
follows: 
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where Gt is real government consumption expenditure, 
 A is a constant, 
 Pgt is the price of government-provided goods and services, as measured by the 
government price deflator, 
 Pyt is the price of private goods and services as measured by the GDP deflator, 
 Yt is real GDP, 
 POPt is population, and 
 β1, β2, β3 and β4 are elasticities to be estimated. 
 This equation bears a close resemblance to the formulations in Borcherding and 
Deacon (1972) and Bergstrom and Goodman (1973). For details see Gemmell (1990).  
Our actual estimating equation is as follows: 
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where INDUEMR is the ratio of industrial employment to total employment, and 
 WDV is an intercept dummy variable which takes the value of 1 for the Iraq-Iran 
war (1980-1988) period, and zero otherwise. 
 
A brief explanation for including these explanatory variables was provided above. 
 1
 2.2. The institutional model 
An important advance in the study of the public sector occurred in the 1950s, when some 
economists applied the tools of their trade to non-market decision making, i.e. economic 
theory was applied to issues which had previously been in the domain of political science. 
This development, initiated by, inter alia, Black (1948), Downs (1957), and Buchanan 
and Tullock (1962), is now generally referred to as "public choice". See Mueller (1989) 
for a comprehensive account of this approach. 
 An important conclusion from the public choice school is that the outcomes of the 
public sector are determined, in part, by institutions, their procedures and the people 
working in those institutions. In other words, fiscal institutions can determine outcomes. 
This seemingly trite point, i.e. that institutions matter, is central to the public choice 
literature. As Buchanan and Wagner (1977: 636) put it "We are institutionalists in the 
sense that we think that arrangements or rules do affect outcomes." 
  
 The institutional model we are estimating can be stated as follows: 
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where EDV is an intercept dummy variable which equals unity when there has been an 
election, and zero otherwise,  
 PRDV is pre-revolutionary dummy variable, 
 SEREMR is the ratio of service employment to total employment, 
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 OPEN is an index of openness as defined by total exports and imports divided by 
GDP, 
 U is the rate of unemployment, 
 HHIT is the Hirschman-Herfindahl index (Hirschman, 1964) of tax complexity, 
 DTAXR is the ratio of direct taxes to total taxes, 
 ∆ln(Py) is the inflation rate using the GDP price deflator, and 
 Gt-1 is lagged government expenditure as a proxy for bureaucratic inertia or 
incrementalism. 
 A rational for these explanatory variables was considered above. For a detailed 
account of the literature see Doessel and Valadkhani (2002).    
 Table 1 summarises both the notation to be employed in this study and the 
expected theoretical signs of the relevant explanatory coefficients in both the 
economic/structural model and the institutional model. [Table 1 about here] 
 
2.3. Some relevant background and time series data for Iran 
Before considering the public sector in Iran it is useful to sketch some institutional and 
non-economic factors (for example political and constitutional) within which decision 
making takes place. Privatization of fiscally hemorrhaging public enterprises is one of the 
key objectives of "total restructuring" of the Iranian economy accommodated in the Third 
Five-Year Development Plan (2000/01-2004/05, fiscal year ending March 20). Therefore 
it is very important to know the determinants of government expenditure. In addition to 
economic factors, the conduct of fiscal policy in Iran has also been affected by a number 
of non-economic or external factors associated with the upheavals consequential to the 1979 
Islamic Revolution, the destructive eight-year war with Iraq (1980-1988), the freezing of the 
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country's foreign assets, a volatile international oil market, international economic 
sanctions, and constitutional and institutional bottlenecks. 
For example, in September 1999 the government made an attempt to privatize 
several major industries, including communications, post, rail, petrochemicals, and even 
upstream oil and gas. However it is highly unlikely that the government can succeed in its 
reform agenda because the conservative party supports monopolies, and those interest-
groups who enjoy an under-taxed economy. Karbassian (2000) believes that the economic 
activities of the tax-exempt revolutionary organizations (Bonyads) account for about 11 
per cent of Iran’s GDP. In the third plan the ratio of tax to GDP is assumed not to exceed 
6 per cent. This assumption clearly implies that the government, for political reasons, is 
not going to launch a major tax reform during the course of plan.  
Another non-economic and non-quantifiable factor in explaining the size of 
government and the success of recent privatisation policies pertains to a conservative and 
outdated constitution. Iran’s third Plan expects private investment to grow at 8.5 per cent 
per annum while the private sector in Iran’s constitution has been treated as “residuals”. 
Article 44 of Iran’s constitution states that: 
 “The economy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is to consist of three sectors: state, 
cooperative, and private, and is to be based on systematic and sound planning. The state 
sector is to include all large-scale and mother industries, foreign trade, major minerals, 
banking, insurance, power generation, dams, and large-scale irrigation networks, radio 
and television, post, telegraph and telephone services, aviation, shipping, roads, 
railroads and the like; all these will be publicly owned and administered by the State. The 
cooperative sector is to include cooperative companies and enterprises concerned with 
production and distribution, in urban and rural areas, in accordance with Islamic 
criteria. The private sector consists of those activities concerned with agriculture, animal 
husbandry, industry, trade, and services that supplement the economic activities of the 
state and cooperative sectors. …The scope of each of these sectors as well as the 
regulations and conditions governing their operation, will be specified by law”(source: 
http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/ir00000_.html#A044_) 
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For a concise discussion of these developments see the following:: Pesaran (1992, 
1995), Akhavi-Pour, (1994), Karshenas and Pesaran (1995), Sundararajan, Marston and 
Shabsigh (1998), Amuzegar (1992, 2000), Alizadeh (2000), Valadkhani (2001). Also for 
the impact of various types of government expenditure on the economy see Valadkhani 
(1997, 1998). 
 
In terms of the World Bank's classification of countries on the basis of per capita income, 
Iran is categorised as a lower middle income country. Unlike federations such as the U.S., 
Canada, Australia and Germany, Iran has a government structure which consists of only a 
central government and a (relatively small) local government sector. In this respect it is 
similar to the United Kingdom and New Zealand.  
 Figure 1 presents time series data on real GDP and real government expenditure 
(1982 prices) for the period analysed in this study, 1963-2000. It is clear that GDP has not 
experienced steady growth through time. The early period (1963-1978), associated with 
steady oil exports, can be characterised as one of steady growth. It should be noted that 
Iran has been subject to the various economic forces associated with the oil industry, as 
described in Adelman (1995). But with the invasion of Iraq in 1979 GDP fell and 
continued to fall until 1981. The period of the late 1970s and the 1980s is dominated by 
internal political events and the Iraq-Iran war. In this period oil exports fell dramatically. 
With the cessation of war in 1988 oil exports resumed and ushered in another period of 
steady growth in the period 1988-1993. Per capita income in Iran mirrors these general 
movements, reaching a high of 397,603 rials (constant 1982 prices) in 1976, and a low of 
201,137 rials in 1988, and then recovery to a level of 269,713 rials in 2000.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
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 As indicated in Figure 1, the government sector has also exhibited fluctuations 
during the 1963-2000 period. As a percentage of GDP, government consumption 
expenditure (constant 1982 prices) has increased from 5.4 per cent in 1963 to a maximum 
of 21.2 per cent in 1981. Relative size then fell to a low of 10.7 per cent in 1989 and rose 
to 13.1 per cent in 2000. For further details on the structure of the Iranian economy see, 
inter alia, Karshenas (1990), and Valadkhani (2001). 
 The measure of government for this study is real government consumption 
expenditure (1982 prices). It  would be desirable if we could separate expenditure on the 
security system and defence, given that governments may make decisions on defence 
expenditure in a quiet different way from civilian expenditure. However, such a 
disaggregation of the data is not available as Iranian government accounts combine both 
capital and current expenditures on defence (MPO, 2000). This creates an apples-and-
oranges problem which we cannot resolve. Table 2 presents descriptions of the data 
employed and summary statistics. 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
3. Estimation Procedure 
The empirical procedure has been to estimate equation (2) and equation (3) separately. 
These two equations performed quiet well in terms of goodness-of-fit, most of the 
coefficients being statistically significant (at the 5 per cent level), and having the expected 
theoretical signs. However, there were some diagnostic tests which indicated mis-
specification in the structural model and the violation of the normality assumption in the 
institutional model’s residuals. Furthermore, the application of non-nested tests [the Cox 
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test, the Ericsson Instrumental Variable (IV) test, the Sargan restricted/unrestricted 
reduced form test, and the encompassing (F) test, Hendry and Doornik (1999)], to these 
separate models explaining government expenditure, indicate rejection of each model. 
Essentially these results signify that an explanation of government expenditure in Iran 
cannot be found in either a solely institutional/political model or a pure 
economic/structural model. These non-nested test results, not reported here, are available 
from the authors on request. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
An important step before estimating government current expenditure is to determine the 
time series properties of the data. This is an important issue since the use of non-
stationary data in the absence of cointegration can result in spurious regression results. To 
this end, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test has been adopted to examine the 
stationarity, or otherwise, of the time series data. It was found that all the time series 
variables in equations (2) and (3) were I(1), or stationary after first differencing. 
Therefore if the resulting residual (εt) in an equation containing these variables is white 
noise, or I(0), according to the Engle-Granger representation theorem (Engle and Granger, 
1987), it can be argued that there is a long-term relationship between real government 
expenditure and its major determinants. Due to lack of space, the ADF test results are not 
reported but are available from the authors upon request.  
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As pointed out in the previous section some diagnostic tests indicated the inadequacy of  
the separate equations to explain government expenditure. Therefore, attention is now 
directed to the specification and estimation of a comprehensive model including all the 
variables in both models. As before we have applied general-to-specific econometric 
methodology to estimate this equation. The parsimonious equation,  thus obtained, is 
indicated in Table 3.  
[Table 3 about here] 
  Table 3 presents the econometric results for such an equation, which 
incorporates both categories of explanatory variables in Equations (2) and (3), if they are 
statistically significant.  This equation performs well in terms of goodness-of-fit statistics 
as well as diagnostic tests: the adjusted R2 is 0.992 and the equation clearly passes the 
overall F test. Note that this  model  passes each and every diagnostic test without any 
exception, and, as a result, this is our preferred equation. 
 There are a number of important points that can be drawn from the estimated 
coefficients of the comprehensive model. First, the relative price coefficient (-0.43) 
indicates that the demand for government goods and services in Iran is inelastic. This 
coefficient is of the same magnitude reported in the prior literature. 
 Second, the coefficient on per capita income (+0.69) indicates that the demand for 
public goods and services is normal: given that this coefficient is less than unity, there is 
no evidence that Wagner's law applies in the context of Iran. 
 Third, the measure of structural change employed here (INDUEMR), has a 
positive estimated coefficient. This means that as the Iranian economy becomes more 
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complex, there is an increased demand for existing services, and/or a demand for new 
services, provided by government. 
 Fourth, the estimated coefficient for the intercept dummy variable for the Iraqi 
war (WDV) is positive and significant, indicating that during the war government current 
expenditure was higher than in the non-war periods. 
 Attention is now directed to the interpretation of the coefficients of the 
institutional variables. The positive coefficient on EDV, albeit not very significant, 
indicates that the government has increased expenditure in election years. It appears from 
the significant (positive) coefficient of the index of openness that government size is 
positively related to this variable. However the expected sign for this variable is negative, 
as it is an offset to the effect of interest groups. The variable (SEREMR), measuring 
interest group influence was also highly significant, yet the offset variable is significant 
but with an unexpected sign. In the context of Iran the openness variable is dominated by 
oil exports sold within the OPEC cartel, and it should be recognised that the oil and gas 
sector is a nationalised industry. Thus the variable (OPEN) indirectly represents a major 
component of government revenue rather than an offset to interest group pressure. As a 
result, the positive sign of this variable is not a counsel of despair. 
 Fiscal illusion, measured by DTAXR, was significant but had the wrong expected 
sign. A final institutional factor which was statistically significant in our final model, was 
inertia or incrementalism, measured by the lagged value of the dependent variable (Gt-1) 
(Incrementalism, of course, could manifest itself by statistically significant lagged 
dependent variables for several years. A two-year, three-year and a four-year lag were 
introduced but were found to be insignificant). It seems that the Wildavsky (1964) 
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argument is relevant in that the size of this year's budget depends upon last year's budget. 
All remaining institutional variables, as considered earlier in this paper, for example 
PRDV and HHIT, are not significant and consequently excluded from  the comprehensive 
model. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
The existing literature of the demand for government goods and services is dominated by 
studies of western countries and services provided by state or local governments. This 
study is "a little bit different" in that it is the first such study of a middle east country with 
a government sector comprising services generally provided by central and state 
governments.  With respect to the first point it should not be automatically concluded that 
economic analysis of this kind is not applicable to a country such as Iran: it should be 
recalled that Pryor (1968) succeeded in analysing government behavior of countries with  
markedly different systems, and that Wagner and Weber (1975) successfully analysed 
governments with different organisational and behavioral (competition or monopoly) 
characteristics.  
 The central focus of this paper is to provide an answer to the question posed by 
Borcherding (1985) concerning the relative importance of economic/structural and 
institutional factors in determining government expenditure. The unique feature of this 
analysis is to apply non-nested tests to shed some light on the issue. It is found, using a 
number of different tests, that "double rejection" is the universal outcome for the separate 
theories: this means that an adequate explanation of government expenditure in Iran 
requires considering both economic/structural and institutional explanatory variables. 
 10
 The significance of this paper may lie in the fact that it has reported the first 
estimates of own-price and income elasticities for current public expenditure in Iran. The 
empirical results obtained (-0.43 and +0.69, respectively) in this paper indicate that, in 
terms of government decision making, the outcomes are not abnormal in comparison with 
the results of other  countries. See Gemmell (1990).     
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Table 1. Economic/structural and institutional explanatory variables applied in the real 
demand for government expenditure (G) in Iran 
Variable name Variable definition Expected sign 
Economic/Structural   
Pg Government price deflator - 
Py GDP price deflator + 
Pg/Py Relative price ratio - 
PERY Real per capita GDP + 
POP Population + 
INDUEMR Ratio of industrial employment to total employment + 
Institutional   
Gt-1 Lagged real government expenditure + 
SEREMR Ratio of service employment to total employment + 
OPEN Index of openness defined as total exports plus imports divided by GDP + 
∆ln(Pyt) Inflation rate using GDP price deflator + 
U Unemployment rate + 
HHIT Hirschman-Herfindahl index of tax complexity - 
DTAXR Ratio of direct taxes to total taxes - 
WDV War dummy variable + 
PRDV Pre-revolutionary period dummy variable ? 
EDV Election dummy variable + 
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Table 2. Summary statistics and description of the data employed, Iran, 1963-2000 
Variables Unit Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
G billion rials (1982 prices) 1529 687 207 2379 
Pg/Py Ratio 1.3 0.4 0.91 2.02 
Y/POP Million rials (1982 prices) 0.2522 0.0566 0.1399 0.3976 
POP Thousand 43338 13224 24249 65604 
INDUEMR Ratio 0.287 0.029 0.244 0.342 
U Unemployment rate 9.6 4.5 3.2 16.2 
SEREMR Ratio 0.39 0.08 0.26 0.51 
OPEN Ratio 0.36 0.16 0.09 0.76 
HHIT 1>HHIT>0 0.29 0.03 0.23 0.36 
DTAXR Ratio 0.51 0.14 0.25 0.77 
∆(Pyt)/Pyt-1 Inflation rate (%) 17.2 14.2 -4.2 57.4 
 
Sources: Management and Planning Organisation (2000); Iran’s Central Bank (2002);   
and Tabibian, et al. (2001).  
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Table 3. Regression results for government current expenditure, ln(G), Iran, 1963-2000 
Explanatory variables Results 
Intercept 8.5 (8.2)* 
Ln(Pg/Py)t -0.43 (-3.5)* 
Ln(Yt/POPt) 0.69 (6.1)* 
Ln(POPt) - 
Ln(INDUEMRt) 1.31 (5.5)* 
Ln(Ut) - 
WDVt 
0.16 
(4.1)* 
EDVt 
0.04 
(1.40) 
Ln(OPEN)t 0.06 (1.8)** 
Ln(DTAXRt) 0.26 (3.3)* 
Ln(SEREMRt) 0.67 (4.6)* 
Ln(Gt-1) 0.31 (3.7)* 
Goodness-of-fit statistics  
Adjusted R2 0.992 
F- Statistic F(9,32)=463* 
Diagnostic tests  
DW 2.2 
ARa 1- 2 F(2,30)=1.1 
ARCHb 1 F(1,24)=2.8 
Normalityc Chi2(2) 1.51 
White Heteroskedasticity  
Xi 
 Xi*Xj 
- 
F(16,9)=0.78 
RESETd F(1,31)=0.58 
Stochastic residualse I(0) 
Notes: 
 Data in parentheses are t statistics.  * and  ** indicate that the relevant null hypotheses are rejected at 
 5 and 10 per cent significance levels, respectively. 
a ) Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation up to orders 1 and 2; b) Autocorrelation 
conditional heteroskedasticity test using one lag; c) Normality test of residuals based on the skewness and 
kurtosis of the residuals; d) Ramsey’s RESET test using the square of the fitted values; and e) Based on the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (Akaike information criterion is used to determine the optimal lag 
length in the corresponding ADF regression. 
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Figure 1. GDP and government consumption expenditure (G), Iran, 
1963-2000, (1982 prices) 
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Source: Tabibian, et al. (2001). 
